CryptoMaze: Atomic Off-Chain Payments in Payment Channel Network

Payment protocols developed to realize off-chain transactions in Payment channel network (PCN) assumes the underlying routing algorithm transfers the payment via a single path. However, a path may not have sufficient capacity to route a transaction. It is inevitable to split the payment across multiple paths. If we run independent instances of the protocol on each path, the execution may fail in some of the paths, leading to partial transfer of funds. A payer has to reattempt the entire process for the residual amount. We propose a secure and privacy-preserving payment protocol, CryptoMaze. Instead of independent paths, the funds are transferred from sender to receiver across several payment channels responsible for routing, in a breadth-first fashion. Payments are resolved faster at reduced setup cost, compared to existing state-of-the-art. Correlation among the partial payments is captured, guaranteeing atomicity. Further, two party ECDSA signature is used for establishing scriptless locks among parties involved in the payment. It reduces space overhead by leveraging on core Bitcoin scripts. We provide a formal model in the Universal Composability framework and state the privacy goals achieved by CryptoMaze. We compare the performance of our protocol with the existing single path based payment protocol, Multi-hop HTLC, applied iteratively on one path at a time on several instances. It is observed that CryptoMaze requires less communication overhead and low execution time, demonstrating efficiency and scalability.Comment: 30 pages, 9 figures, 1 tabl

Chrisimos: A useful Proof-of-Work for finding Minimal Dominating Set of a graph

Hash-based Proof-of-Work (PoW) used in the Bitcoin Blockchain leads to high energy consumption and resource wastage. In this paper, we aim to re-purpose the energy by replacing the hash function with real-life problems having commercial utility. We propose Chrisimos, a useful Proof-of-Work where miners are required to find a minimal dominating set for real-life graph instances. A miner who is able to output the smallest dominating set for the given graph within the block interval time wins the mining game. We also propose a new chain selection rule that ensures the security of the scheme. Thus our protocol also realizes a decentralized minimal dominating set solver for any graph instance. We provide formal proof of correctness and show via experimental results that the block interval time is within feasible bounds of hash-based PoW.Comment: 20 pages, 3 figures. An abridged version of the paper got accepted in The International Symposium on Intelligent and Trustworthy Computing, Communications, and Networking (ITCCN-2023) held in conjunction with the 22nd IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom-2023

Design of Anonymous Endorsement System in Hyperledger Fabric

Permissioned Blockchain has become quite popular with enterprises forming consortium since it prioritizes trust over privacy. One of the popular platforms for distributed ledger solution, Hyperledger Fabric, requires a transaction to be endorsed or approved by a group of special members known as endorsers before undergoing validation. To endorse a transaction, an endorser mentions its identity along with the signature so that it can be verified later. However, for certain transactions, difference in opinion may exist among endorsers. Disclosing the identity of an endorser may lead to conflict within the consortium. In such cases, an endorsement policy which not only allows an endorser to support a transaction discreetly, but at the same time takes into account the decision of the majority is preferred. Thus we propose an Anonymous Endorsement System which uses a threshold endorsement policy in order to address the issue. To realize a t-out-of-n endorsement policy, using any of the existing threshold ring signature for our endorsement system would have violated the privacy of endorsers as either the identity or the secret key of the endorsers get revealed to the party who recombines the signature after collecting each signature share. All these factors motivated us to design a new ring signature scheme, called Fabric\u27s Constant-Sized Linkable Ring Signature (FCsLRS) with Transaction-Oriented linkability for hiding identity of the endorsers. We have implemented the signature scheme in Golang and analyzed its security and performance by varying the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) modulus size. Feasibility of implementation is supported by experimental analysis. Signature and tag generation time is quite fast and remains constant irrespective of change in message length or endorsement set size for a given RSA modulus value, assuming all the endorsers generates their signature in parallel. Each verifier is required to count and check individual valid ring signature. If the aggregate is above the threshold value, stated by the endorsement policy, then it confirms that the transaction is valid. This increases the verification time depending on the threshold value, but has very little effect on the scalability since generally $t<<n$. Lastly, we also discuss the integration of the scheme on v1.2 Hyperledger Fabric

Securing Lightning Channels against Rational Miners

Payment channel networks (e.g., the Lightning Network in Bitcoin) constitute one of the most popular scalability solutions for blockchains. Their safety relies on parties being online to detect fraud attempts on-chain and being able to timely react by publishing certain transactions on-chain. However, a cheating party may bribe miners in order to censor those transactions, resulting in loss of funds for the cheated party: these attacks are known in the literature as timelock bribing attacks. In this work, we present the first channel construction that does not require parties to be online and, at the same time, is resistant to timelock bribing attacks. We start by proving for the first time that Lightning channels are secure against timelock bribing attacks in the presence of rational channel parties under the assumption that these parties constantly monitor the mempool and never deplete the channel in one direction. The latter underscores the importance of keeping a coin reserve in each channel as implemented in the Lightning Network, albeit for different reasons. We show, however, that the security of the Lightning Network against Byzantine channel parties does not carry over to a setting in which miners are rational and accept timelock bribes. Next, we introduce CRAB, the first Lightning-compatible channel construction that provides security against Byzantine channel parties and rational miners. CRAB leverages miners\u27 incentives to safeguard the channel, thereby also forgoing the unrealistic assumption of channel parties constantly monitoring the mempool. Finally, we show how our construction can be refined to eliminate the major assumption behind payment channels, i.e., the need for online participation. To that end, we present Sleepy CRAB the first provably secure channel construction under rational miners that enables participants to go offline indefinitely. We also provide a proof-of-concept implementation of Sleepy CRAB and evaluate its cost in Bitcoin, thereby demonstrating its practicality

LightSwap: An Atomic Swap Does Not Require Timeouts At Both Blockchains

Security and privacy issues with centralized exchange services have motivated the design of atomic swap protocols for decentralized trading across currencies. These protocols follow a standard blueprint similar to the 2-phase commit in databases: (i) both users first lock their coins under a certain (cryptographic) condition and a timeout; (ii-a) the coins are swapped if the condition is fulfilled; or (ii-b) coins are released after the timeout. The quest for these protocols is to minimize the requirements from the scripting language supported by the swapped coins, thereby supporting a larger range of cryptocurrencies. The recently proposed universal atomic swap protocol [IEEE S&P’22] demonstrates how to swap coins whose scripting language only supports the verification of a digital signature on a transaction. However, the timeout functionality is cryptographically simulated with verifiable timelock puzzles, a computationally expensive primitive that hinders its use in battery-constrained devices such as mobile phones. In this state of affairs, we question whether the 2-phase commit paradigm is necessary for atomic swaps in the first place. In other words, is it possible to design a secure atomic swap protocol where the timeout is not used by (at least one of the two) users? In this work, we present LightSwap, the first secure atomic swap protocol that does not require the timeout functionality (not even in the form of a cryptographic puzzle) by one of the two users. LightSwap is thus better suited for scenarios where a user, running an instance of LightSwap on her mobile phone, wants to exchange coins with an online exchange service running an instance of LightSwap on a computer. We show how LightSwap can be used to swap Bitcoin and Monero, an interesting use case since Monero does not provide any scripting functionality support other than linkable ring signature verification